The economics of partnerships have been of enduring interest to economists, but many issues regarding the dynamics of these organizations remain unclear. We examine roughly 700 private equity partnerships, and show that (a) the allocation of fund economics to individual partners seems divorced from past success as an investor, being instead critically driven by status as a founder, (b) that the underprovision of carried interest and ownership-and inequality in fund economics more generally-leads to the departures of senior partners, and (c) the departures of partners have significant negative effects on the ability of funds to raise additional capital.
I.

Introduction
Partnerships were the dominant organizational form of businesses for several millennia, and even today, remain critical to the way in which the professional service and investment sectors are run. Several theories have been offered about the prevalence and persistence of this ownership form. The classic formulation of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggests that in settings where employees are difficult to monitor, a partnership structure may provide optimal incentives for hard work.
1 Alternatively, Wilhelm (2004, 2008) suggest that it may serve as a commitment device, ensuring that the senior partners properly monitor and train successors, at least until the need for physical investment in an industry becomes too great. In yet another variation, Levin and Tadelis (2005) argue that partnerships with equal sharing rules can actually overcome their clients' concerns about the lack of the observability of partner effort: because of the sharing rule, partners have a powerful incentive to closely monitor partners, and ensure that they are productive.
At the same time, these partnerships may raise issues. Dividing profits according to some set formula may lead to moral hazard problems, where partners' awareness that they are only capturing a portion of profits that they are generating reduces their motivation to work hard (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982) . This hypothesis has been empirically supported in a variety of papers, from Gaynor and Gertler's (1995) study of medical practices to Abramitzky's (2008) analysis of Israeli kibbutzim.
At the same time, a variety of mechanisms may alleviate this free-riding problem, such as the peer pressure posited by Kandel and Lazear (1992) and the relational contracts studied in the partnership setting by Rayo (2007) . Numerous empirical studies also suggest that incentive schemes with partnership-like aspects need not lead to decreasing effort, especially when combined with other measures to reduce free riding (e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1998; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003) .
But while the cross-sectional moral hazard issues in partnerships are well understood, the dynamic problems that can emerge in these settings have been less well appreciated. Because of the opaqueness of the partnership and the difficulty of determining individual contributions-the very reasons that the literature suggests partnerships exist in the first place-the founders of partnerships may not appropriately reward younger contributors. Were the younger partners to leave to begin their own organization, they may find it difficult to establish a comparable reputation and status. As a result, the founders may command a disproportionate share of the economics generated by the partnership, even to the point that the other partners provide less-than-optimal effort.
In this paper, we analyze these issues in the context of the private equity funds. In particular,
we examine over 700 partnerships analyzed in the course of the due diligence process by a major institutional investor. In each case, we have detailed data on how the economics of the fund-in particular, the carried interest (the profit share) and ownership of the management company-is split between the individual partners. We link this information to that on the past performance of individual partners' investments, the characteristics of the current, subsequent, and prior funds raised by the group, and the backgrounds and career paths of the individual partners.
Three clear patterns emerge from our analysis. First, the allocation of fund economics is typically weighted toward the founders of the firms. Individual investors' past performance seems to have little influence on economic allocation, even among the most senior group of partners.
Second, the distributions of carried interest and ownership appear to substantially affect the stability of the partnership. Individual senior partners with a smaller economic share are more likely to leave the partnership, even after controlling for their past performance. Partnerships with a more unequal distribution of economics are less stable. Third, partners' departures have a negative effect on private equity groups' ability to raise additional funds.
In addition to the literature on partnerships briefly discussed above, this paper is related to two strands of literature. First is the work on pay inequality within workplaces, and its consequences.
Consistent with the results here, several studies suggest that inequality of compensation can lead to a reduction in productivity and increase in turnover among employees. Examples include Card, et al. (2012) , Charness and Kuhn (2007) , and Cullen and Pakzad-Hursony (2016) . (It should be noted that the workers typically studied in this literature have substantially lower levels of compensation and autonomy than those studied here.)
Second, there is a specific body of work on compensation in venture capital and private equity partnerships. This literature has focused on the aggregate split between the investors in the funds (limited partners, or LPs) and fund managers (general partners, or GPs), rather than between the GPs. To briefly review this literature, Gompers and Lerner (1999) find differences in the compensation schemes of new and established firms. Examining 419 U.S. VC partnerships formed between 1978 and 1992, they show that new and smaller firms tended to have higher fixed base compensation (i.e., from fees), while the compensation of established firms was more variable and more sensitive to performance. The authors ascribe this to a learning model of performance, wherein GPs must be motivated by the prospect of financial gains once their reputation has been established. In a related work, Chung, et al. (2012) show that the current fund's performance affects GPs' abilities to raise capital for future funds, which can also provide a powerful motivation. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) analyze the economics of the private equity industry using a dataset from a large investor in private equity funds. With detailed information on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006, the authors model the net present value of expected revenue that managers receive. Roughly 66% of expected revenue, the authors found, came from fixed components-in particular, from management fees. Robinson and Sensoy (2013) shows that for a large sample of buyout and venture capital funds from 1984 to 2010, compensation is largely unrelated to net-offee cash flow performance. Nevertheless, market conditions during fundraising are an important driver of compensation, as pay rises and shifts to fixed components during fundraising booms.
They argue that compensation terms reflect agency concerns but at the same time, managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross performance. Phalippou, Rauch, and Umber (2015) show that transactions fees charged by private equity groups are significant in magnitude, vary significantly across GPs, and increase when private equity groups go public. managing partners with significant control over a firm to gain investor consent before transferring a significant amount of control over to a colleague, third-party firm, or investor.
Meanwhile, press accounts suggest that numerous groups have come to grief over these issues.
Already in the late 1990s, industry observers were attributing the dissolution of Golder Thoma
Cressey Rauner into multiple firms to "its history of losing bright associates to competitors willing to share equity." 3 More recently, the internal pressures related to these issues seemed to have escalated. According to the news accounts, "future ownership of the firm" was a major factor that drove president and successor-designate Justin Wender away from Castle Harlan. 4 In 2015, the 28-year old private equity firm gave up on trying to rise capital following a dispute over succession, despite high success on its earlier funds. 5 In 2014, 23 years after its inception, Weston
Presidio suspended its fund raising after a group of partners left to start a new investment firm. Also, in 2015, Doughty Hanson's demise was explained by one investor as follows: "Historically there was an issue with the top guys having all the power and the economics, so there were quite a few spinouts in the past." According to another investor who chose not to invest in the firm's funds, "One of the things that we never got comfortable with was the economics between the two founders and the rest of the team, and as far as I'm concerned that did cause [staff] The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the construction of the dataset and key summary statistics. Section III presents the analyses. The final section concludes the paper.
II. Data
This section provides an overview of the data collection process and the key dependent and independent variables defined.
A. The Sample and Potential Biases
Our analysis employs a proprietary and novel dataset that has been assembled from due diligence reports of one of the world's largest limited partners (LPs). The data on the economics of the partnerships was collected from the "Preliminary Investment Proposals" (PIPs) (as well as in some cases the "Final Investment Proposals") prepared by the investment professionals at the LP in the process of fundraising. Of the total number of funds in our sample, about 80% are buyout Our sample is not identical to the investment portfolio of the LP. While most of the funds for which a PIP was completed were eventually funded by the LP, our sample is not conditional on the LP's investment. Furthermore, in a significant number of cases, the due diligence documents on individual partnerships included detailed information of the economics and characteristics of predecessor funds, regardless of whether the LP invested in them or not. Thus, our sample includes a significantly larger number of funds than those the LP has actually invested in. Given the sophistication and size of the LP, the funds in our sample might be more successful than the industry average. At least historically, there has been considerable heterogeneity in the performance of LPs (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai, 2008) . There also might be a "backfill bias": earlier funds in which the LP did not invest are likely to have done disproportionately well.
Finally, the information on the division of carry is not available for all partnerships in our sample. In 12% of the PIPs, we are not able to discern meaningful data on carried interest allocations. The cases with missing data fell into two distinct categories. First, the GP may not have had a set carried interest scheme, but instead allocated it dynamically as the fund's portfolio and performance evolved, or else employ extremely complex schemes. Second, the GP may have refused to include information about the distribution of the economics in its disclosures to the LP.
These refusals were most common with very high-demand venture capital organizations who frequently quantity-ration the amount of funds they raise (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) . This second issue does not typically occur in the buyout sub-sample (throughout the analysis we control for the type of the private equity fund).
B. Measuring Fund Economics
We able to collect two central measures of fund economics: distribution of carried interest ("carry") and ownership of the managing company among fund professionals. Our full sample contains data on carried interest distribution for 280 general partner (GP) organizations and 6,344 investment professionals managing 717 private equity funds. GP ownership distribution is available for 2,041investment professionals managing 191 funds and corresponding to 124 firms.
The scarcity of ownership information is attributed to the GPs' resistance to providing this information, citing its sensitive nature and the fact that it was not normally provided to LPs as part of the due diligence process. As Table I , Panel A illustrates, we are capturing ownership for 36% of the funds in the smallest size quartile, but only for 15% of the funds in the largest size quartile.
A share of carry gives a professional a claim on the return on fund investments, typically in excess of a certain benchmark. Commonly, firm ownership allocation is used to distribute "excess" management and transaction fees, that is, fees in excess of actual expenses. These can be large, especially for larger funds, whose management fees often exceed the actual costs of running the funds. In addition, private equity funds have traditionally charged a variety of transaction and monitoring fees, which may far exceed costs (though in recent funds, these have been largely reimbursed to the LPs). Based on our discussions with GPs, in a few cases, excess fees appear to be allocated to the partners according to the same formula that is used to divide carried interest.
A less common, but potentially significant, form of compensation associated with ownership stake is from liquidity events such as sales of minority stakes to financial institutions, sovereign wealth funds, and the like; or, in rarer instances, sale of entire management companies. The proceeds from these sales (to the extent they are not reinvested in the businesses) are divided among the GPs in proportion to their ownership stakes. In addition, the equity stakes of senior partners may be sold to the next generation of partners, though often at a discount to the value that would be garnered in an arms-length transaction (see, for instance, Lerner and Leamon, 2013) .
Most dramatically, when a management company is taken public, these stakes can become quite valuable and liquid.
While carried interest and ownership are the key aspects of fund economics, there are other compensation elements for private equity partners. In particular, individual partners are paid a salary and a bonus, which are frequently a relatively modest share of senior professionals' compensation. 10 Consistent with this observation, these revenue streams are rarely reported in a PIP.
Although we observe all compensation information reported to the LP, we focus our analysis on two levels of partners: (i) those in the top echelon of private equity partnerships (whom we term "senior partners"), and (ii) those in second echelon ("junior partners"). Collectively, we refer to the top two bands as "all partners" or "senior professionals." To assign investment professionals into one of these groups, we rely on their professional titles. There is very little consistency in the titles used across private equity groups. In all, 161 different job titles of professionals were Coding the individuals' biographies in this way allows us to make inter-firm comparisons, regardless of the titles that different firms use. For instance, in a representative firm, a senior managing partner is given a value of 1, a managing partner a value of 2, a principal 3, an associate 4, and an analyst 5.
Based on this classification, if a given fund has more than one partner with the top title,
partners with values of 1 and 2 are counted as senior and junior partners respectively. In cases where there is only one individual with the top title (e.g., senior managing director), those in the first and second bands (e.g., managing directors) are counted as senior partners, and individuals in the third band (e.g., directors) are counted as junior partners.
In total, there are 674 partnerships (out of 717 fund with carry information) in our sample for which we have information on carry division for one of the two top tiers of partners. This sample includes 2,577 individuals who are classified as senior partners, and 1,394 individuals who are classified as junior partners. We also collect information on founders: there are 1,032 investment professionals in our sample who are classified as founders. The size of the sample will be smaller if we condition it on the availability of other variables; we will report the actual size of the sample when doing the analysis.
C. Other Fund-and Partner-Level Information
In addition to the carry split and ownership data, we collected a variety of data on the partners and the funds. We collected information on the performance and size of earlier and subsequent funds. For those funds to which the LP committed capital, we use detailed information on cash flows, which allows us to calculate public market equivalents (PMEs). This information is augmented by cash flow data provided by Preqin, a data vendor whose data are largely collected through Freedom of Information Act requests to public pensions and endowments. For the rest, we use the internal rate of return (IRR) and the multiple of invested capital (MOIC), two standard performance measures that are widely used in the private equity industry. This information is collected from various sources, including Bison, Pitchbook, and Preqin. We obtain information on the final size of funds using information from the LP and public databases such as Preqin and Pitchbook. One subtle issue was posed by larger private equity organizations that had different "fund families": e.g., a distinct series of buyout funds raised for U.S., European, and Asian transactions. In these cases, we examined earlier and later funds within the same fund family (e.g.,
European Buyout Funds I, II, and III).
From PIPs, in addition to titles, we gathered information on the individual characteristics of each investment professional, including their name, age, educational background, and previous work experience.
In addition, the LP undertook an attribution analysis, in which they assessed the performance of each partner's earlier investments over his or her past two to four funds (whether within the same firm or elsewhere). These analyses can be challenging to undertake, as the mapping between individual partners and transactions may not be readily apparent (for instance, funds may seek to downplay the role of a departed partner). In some cases, the LP either could not obtain the needed data from the GPs or did not have the resources needed to complete the analysis. As a result, we have information on performance in prior funds for about 1,290 investment professionals (248 different funds) in one of the top two tiers of seniority. In some analyses below, we focus on what we term "top" investors, which we use to designate those with a gross investment multiple of two times or more. In unreported robustness checks, we use a three-times gross multiple as the cut-off for top investors.
Furthermore, we record the timing of partners' departures. This information is based on due diligence documents as well as on extensive web research using news stories, firm web sites, and professional databases such as LinkedIn and Spokeo.
III. Analysis of Fund Economics
We seek to understand the causes and consequences of the division of the economics of funds in four parts. First, we present summary statistics on the fund economics. Then, we analyze the determinants of the distribution of the economics across the partners. Third, we examine the relationship between fund economics and the departure of investment professionals. Finally, we examine the consequences of these departures for the GPs' future fundraising. Table I , Panels B and C shows a basic summary of the division of carried interest and ownership at the time of the raising of the fund. We present in Panel B the distribution of carried interest and ownership for all partners by fund geography and type. We then look in Panel C at the economics for the senior and junior partners separately, as well as departure rates of all partners and those with superior prior investment performance (as defined above). Panel C also summarizes the primary measurement that we will use to examine the overall distribution of the economics of funds, a measure that we term "inequality": the ratio of the carried interest or ownership share of the individual with the largest such allocation to the average share. We report in the upper part of Panel C measures for the senior and junior partners separately. When we undertake the inequality calculations in the lower part of Panel C, we present these for the senior partners and then across all partners.
A. The Division of Fund Economics
We find substantial differences between the senior partners and junior partners. First, the senior partners (not surprisingly) receive a greater share of the economics. The mean (median) senior partner receives 15% (13%) of the carried interest and 21% (18%) of the ownership, while for junior partners, the corresponding numbers are 7% (5%) and 3% (0%).
Second, the measures of inequality increase substantially when we look at all partners. For senior partners alone, the mean (median) measure of carry inequality measured as maximum to mean carry is 1.41 (1.27); when all partners are considered, the corresponding ratio is 1.80 (1.63).
These patterns are even starker for ownership. For senior partners alone, the mean (median) measure of ownership inequality is 1.68 (1.33); when all partners are considered, the corresponding ratio is 2.63 (2.17).
Finally, the table reveals that departures of partners are relatively rare. The median fund has no departures of any partners between the closing of the current and the next fund. For the mean fund, the probability that a given senior partner will depart is 9%, for junior partners, 12%. The probability of the departure of a top performer is slightly lower.
[TABLE I]
Figure 1 provides a richer look of the division of the key economic drivers of compensation.
In each of the two panels, the distribution is presented for the senior and junior partners. In Panel A, the distribution of carried interest for senior partners reaches its peak at about 10%, while the modal junior partner (using not only the partition shown in the graph, but also coarser and finer divisions) has no carry. There is a long tail of senior partners with carry shares exceeding 20%, while there are many fewer junior partners with such a large share of the economics.
The patterns with ownership are more skewed, as Panel B reveals. While abut three-quarters of the senior partners have some ownership in the firm, only about 30% of the junior partners do.
Thus, ownership of the management company is much more concentrated than carried interest.
Using the partition scheme in the graph, the distribution of ownership for the senior partners is essentially flat between a zero and twenty-five percent share, while for junior partners with some ownership, the share falls off very quickly.
[FIGURE 1]
Figure 2 depicts the measures of carry and ownership inequality. Panel A shows that distribution of carry inequality for the senior partners for funds of various sizes, as well as all partners. For all funds, the modal outcome (using this and other partition schemes) is a very even distribution of carry-in fact, for 24% percent of the funds, the carry inequality is one exactly. But as we look at progressively larger funds, the carry inequality increases. We present here the smoothed distribution (kernel density) for funds with more than three and more than eight senior partners. With funds with three or more partners, the distribution peaks at about 1.25; for those with eight or more partners, near 1.75. When we examine the carry inequality computed using all partners, the distribution not only has a higher mean (as we saw in Table 1 ), but peaks about 1.5.
In Panel B, we examine the distribution of ownership inequality in a similar manner. There is a long tail of observations, with some groups exhibiting extreme ownership inequality. Again, the inequality is substantially greater when we examine all partners than when just senior partners are analyzed.
[FIGURE 2]
In Figure 3 , we look at the dynamics of these patterns. In Panels A and C, we look across different fund numbers (for instance, the third fund raised by a group as opposed to the second).
We present in each case the mean inequality measure for a fund of a given number. Of course, there are many more observations of the organizations' second funds than their twelfth ones. We see that carry and ownership inequality falls, as private equity organizations mature, though the pattern is more diffuse when it comes to ownership inequality. This pattern holds whether we look at just the senior partners or all the partners (where, as seen above, the measure of carry inequality is typically higher).
In Panels B and D, we look at the evolution across funds of different vintage years. Because of the maturation effect identified in Panels A and C, we might anticipate that carry inequality would fall over time. At the same time, new funds enter the industry, whose carry splits may be less or more equal than the others. We see only a modest fall in carry and ownership inequality over time.
[FIGURE 3]
In unreported analyses, we look at these patterns for two subsets of individuals. First, we restrict the analysis exclusively to founders and examine their share over time. We find that the founders' share not only falls as funds mature, but also has decreased in more recent vintages. In a second analysis, we restrict the analysis to partners in "young" organizations (those in the first three funds). We find here only modest decreases in inequality over time.
B. Determinants of Fund Economics Distributions
The first empirical question relates to the drivers of the distribution of fund economics. We examine what are the key factors that drive how large carried interest and ownership stakes individuals receive.
As we will see in the regressions in Table II , an important driver of fund economics is whether the individual is a founder. Because the founders are overwhelmingly senior partners, we focus on them in Figure 4 . This left chart shows that the mean founder receives a much larger share of the carried interest than the mean non-founder: 19.2% vs. 11.3%. The right chart shows that a similar pattern holds when we examine ownership. Again, the senior partner who is a founder has an average ownership stake of 30.8%, while the mean non-founder has a stake only of 13.6%.
[FIGURE 4]
This impression is corroborated in the regression analyses reported in Table II . We present separate analyses of carry and ownership stakes for senior and junior partners. We begin with the broadest possible sample, controlling for status as a founder. We then control for fund characteristics, add a control variable for the past investment multiple of the partner's investments (a step which substantially reduced the sample size), and finally instead add a variety of controls for the partner's characteristics (which again substantially limits the sample size).
In Panel A, we focus on senior partners. In each case, status as a founder has a strong and significant impact on carry and ownership, increasing the former by 7-8% (relative to a mean of 15%) and the later by 10-19% (relative to a mean of 21%). Turning to the junior partners in Panel B (where, not surprisingly, far fewer individuals are founders), the effects continue to be strong, though smaller in magnitude: 3-5% for carried interest (relative to a mean of 7%) and 4-5% for ownership (relative to a mean of 3%).
In addition to a strong founder effect, we also see in the regressions that funds with a higher sequence number are associated with a declining share of carried interest for senior partners and a larger share for junior partners, consistent with the evidence around decreasing carry inequality shown in Figure 3 . Larger funds have reduced carry and ownership stakes for all partners, perhaps because of the increasing likelihood that some of the economics was held (i.e., as a result of a founding sponsorship or a subsequent financing arrangement) by a third party.
Most strikingly, past performance of senior partners matters has explanatory power for their ownership stake, but not for carried interest. For junior partners, the pattern is contradictory: while better performing partners have a larger carry share, they actually have reduced ownership.
(Although we have to keep in mind that the sub-sample of junior partners for whom we have ownership data is much smaller.)
[TABLE II] C. Fund Economics and Departures of Partners
A natural next question relates to the implications of these carry distribution schemes. As noted in the introduction, the simple fact that carry distributions are unequal may not be problematic.
The investment skills of partners may vary (as shown, for instance, in Ewens and Rhodes- Kropf, 2015) , and the compensation scheme may reflect this fact. Partners may contribute to the success of the firm in a variety of ways in addition to selecting and overseeing attractive investments, from managing the raising of capital to communicating with LPs to overseeing the investment review process.
One natural place to look to understand the consequences of these economic choices is at the decision of professionals to leave the firms. In Figure 5 , we take a first look at these patterns. In
Panel A, we compare senior partners who left by the time of the closing of the next fund to those who were still there then; in Panel B, we undertake a similar comparison of departing and remaining junior partners.
We find that for senior and junior partners, partners who stay have significantly higher carry stakes, though the magnitudes of the levels and differences are larger for the senior partners (16% vs 9%, as opposed to 6% vs. 5%). There is an even more dramatic differentiation in ownership stake than in the case of carried interest among the senior partners: while those who stay until the next fund have 23% of the ownership, those who leave only have 13%. Among the junior partners, these differences are insignificant, doubtless reflecting the low probability that junior partners receive ownership stakes in the first place.
A natural concern is whether the departing partners are underachievers, and thus are more likely to be asked to leave the partnership. The same poor performance may explain their low share of the fund economics. To address the possibility that correlations are leading to spurious conclusions, we examine the performance attributed to the investors who ultimately stay or leave.
Recall that the performance attribution is done at the time of due diligence on the funds, before closing of the fund (and any departures of partners). Thus, these evaluations should not be dragged down by the natural temptation of fund managers to saddle a departed partner with the poorest transactions. Here, we see no significant patterns: while the departing senior partners do slightly worse (a multiple of 1.9 vs. 2.3) and the departing junior partners do better (a multiple of 2.8 vs.
2.2), none of these differences are statistically significant.
Finally, we examine how the overall carry inequality at a fund affects the decision to stay or leave. We find that senior partners are statistically significantly more likely to stay at a firm with lower carry inequality (an inequality measure of 1.5 for the stayers vs. 1.6 for the leavers). Among the junior partners, the effect seemed to go the other way.
[FIGURE 5]
To examine these patterns in regression analyses, we proceed in two ways. First, in Table III, we remain at the level of the individual partner. We then turn in Table IV to examining these patterns at the fund level.
In Table III , the unit of observation is that of an individual partner-fund pair. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the individual departed before the closing of the next fund, and zero otherwise. We employ a OLS regression specification. We first present that analysis with the carry or ownership share as the key dependent variable (specifications (1), (4) and (7)), then with an additional control for the individual's attributed investment multiple at that point (specifications (2), (5), and (8). The remaining three specifications, use residual from regressing carry and ownership stake on the founders status and a set of fund characteristics (i.e., residuals from analysis reported in Table II specifications (2) and (6) respectively.) As before, we undertake separate analyses for senior and junior partners.
The results in Table III point out that both carried interest and ownership stakes are associated with the decision of senior partners to leave funds: individuals with a lower share of the economics are significantly more likely to leave a fund. Carry stake is also important in explaining departures of both junior partners, but not the ownership stake. As before, this later results is most likely due to the fact that few junior partners hold ownership stake in the firm.
[TABLE III]
Table IV examines decisions to depart on the fund-wide level. Here, we use the share of senior or junior partners leaving before the closing of the next fund as the dependent variable. We examine the share of departures of all partners, as well as those who are top performers (again, using those whose attributed performance is greater than a two times gross multiple, though we also repeat the analysis using a three times threshold, and find that the results are robust).The key independent variable is the measure(s) of carry or/and ownership inequality at the fund.
Here, the results diverge sharply among the senior and junior partners. The share of departures among the senior partners is significantly greater in cases where the inequality of the carry or ownership is greater. In Panel A, a one standard deviation increase in the carry inequality measure (0.49) in regression (1) increases the rate of departures by 2.2%; a one standard deviation increase in the ownership inequality measure in regression (3) (0.88) increases the rate by 3.7%, both of which are economically meaningful relative to the mean departure rate of senior partners of 9.0%.
The results when we look at the share of high-performing departers are equally significant and similar in magnitude. The inequality of compensation levels have much less of an impact on junior partner-level departures in Panel B, suggesting that their departure decisions may be swayed more by the probability of promotion rather than by the distribution of fund economics.
[TABLE IV] D. The Consequences of Departures
A related question is whether these departures affect the private equity firms from which they depart. Even if high achievers are departing in firms with unequal economics, as Table IV suggests, one might hypothesize that they can be readily replaced with no detrimental consequences for the performance of subsequent funds. On the other hand, sophisticated LPs (e.g., Swensen, 2005) often argue that team stability is an important prerequisite to a partnership's enduring investment success. In particular, they highlight that even when a departing GP is replaced by a comparable investor, performance frequently suffers, because of the challenges that investment professionals working together for the first time frequently encounter. Because sophisticated LPs frequently hope to nurture relationships with investment firms for many years, they frequently look askance at such staffing changes. better-performing fund is associated with the raising of a larger subsequent fund.
[TABLE V]
We then turn to looking at these patterns in a regression framework. In Table VI , we use each fund in the sample that raised a follow-on fund through the end of 2015 as an observation. We use as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of size of the next fund raised. We use as independent variables the logarithm of the current fund size, the characteristics of the fund, and (critically for our purposes) the share of departures of the senior partners (in Panel A) and junior partners (Panel B) before the raising of the next fund. We control for the performance of the current fund in some regressions using various metrics (all measured using cash flows in U.S. dollars): the internal rate of return, the multiple of invested capital, and the Kaplan-Schoar public market equivalent (PME) relative to the S&P 500 index. We also look at top-performing departers as a share of the partners.
The results suggest a relationship between the extent of departers and performance. This relationship is statistically weak for the senior partners, however very strong for junior partners, particularly if the departing junior partners are the top performers. These findings suggest that departures have real effects on funds. We also see from the control variables that buyout funds are more likely to grow quickly, as well as better-performing funds.
[TABLE VI]
IV. Conclusion
The economics of partnerships have been a topic of enduring interest to economists. While the cross-sectional moral hazard issues posed by the sharing of partnership economics are well understood, the dynamic problems that can emerge have been less well scrutinized. Here, we examine roughly 700 private equity partnerships, and show that (a) the allocation of fund economics to individual partners seems divorced from past success as an investor, being instead critically driven by status as a founder, (b) that the underprovision of carried interest and ownership-and inequality in fund economics more generally-leads to the departures of senior partners from these funds, and (c) the departures of partners have significant negative effects on the ability of the funds to subsequently raise additional capital.
It must be acknowledged that even if high achievers are disproportionately departing, and these departures negatively impact funds, having funds with a high degree of carry or ownership inequality may still be privately optimal for the founders. They may prefer to have the proverbial larger share of a smaller pie, especially if there is a considerable income to be gleaned from management and transaction fees. But such outcomes are unlikely to be in the interest of the LPs, whose seek to build long-term relationships with stable, high-performing funds.
While this paper takes a first look at fund economics, there is much more to learn here. Figure 2 . Ratio of maximum to mean carry and ownership stake. We present for each fund in the sample our measure of the inequality of carried interest and ownership, computed for senior partners only in the left panel and for all partners on the right. We present the smoothed (kernel density) distribution for funds with more than three and eight senior partners in the upper left panel. Table II Who Gets the Money?
Each observation in the regressions is an individual partner in a given fund. The dependent variable is the share of carried interest or management company ownership accruing to the individual partner. The independent variables include a dummy denoting whether an individual is a founder of the respective firm, the sequence number of the fund and logarithm of its size, a dummy for whether the fund is a buyout one, the individual's past track record (expressed as a gross multiple of invested capital), the individual's years of private equity experience and with the firm, dummies for the individual's experience and education, and geography and vintage year controls. Panel A presents the results for senior partners; Panel B for junior partners. The founder dummy is dropped from regression (7) Each observation in the regressions is an individual partner in a given fund. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the partner left by the time the next fund was closed, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the share of carried interest or ownership allocated to that partner and the individual's past track record (expressed as a gross multiple of invested capital). The economic measures in the third, sixth and ninth regressions are residuals from a regression of the economic measure on partner and fund characteristics. 
Table V Partner Departures and Fund Continuity
Each observation in the regressions is a fund. The variables are the fraction of senior partners (Panel A) or junior partners (Panel B) that left by the next fund, the fraction of top performers (partners with a gross multiple of invested capital greater than two times) leaving, the ratio of the next and current fund size, and the performance of the fund (measured using internal rate of return, multiple of invested capital, or Kaplan-Schoar public market equivalent based on the S&P 500) through the end of 2015 or the latest prior available data.
* , ** , and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table VI Partner Departures and Fund Continuity
Each observation in the regression is a fund. The dependent variable is logarithm of the next fund size. The independent variable are the fraction of partners leaving by the time of the next fund (or top-performing partners, that is, partners with a gross multiple of invested capital greater than two times), the logarithm of current fund size, the fraction of partners who are founders, the sequence number of the fund, a dummy denoting whether the fund is a buyout one, the performance of the fund (measured using internal rate of return, multiple of invested capital, or Kaplan-Schoar public market equivalent based on the S&P 500) through the end of 2015 or the latest prior available data, and controls for the vintage year of the next fund and fund geography. Panel A presents the results for senior partners; Panel B for junior partners. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered at the firm×fund-type level.
